[ad_1]
The People’s Republic of China is evolving into a great power. Its military spending ranks second behind America. The People’s Liberation Army is acquiring formidable capabilities. President Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and de facto PLA commander-in-chief, has demonstrated that he is willing to use China’s military.
This has spurred demands in Washington for greater military outlays, increased force deployments in Asia, and preparation for a great Indo-Pacific war. Citing the so-called Thucydides Trap, derived from the Athenian historian’s celebrated history of the Peloponnesian War, some U.S. policymakers appear to believe conflict is inevitable.
It is not. Beijing is ambitious, to be sure. However, its designs are far less
grand than those of America, which is determined to continue dominating the
globe. Even if Chinese leaders imagine their nation eventually taking over as
the world’s greatest power, such an attempt is likely to be well into the future.
Their country’s weaknesses – demographic, economic, and political – are manifest.
Today the PRC must spend more on internal security than on what is typically
called defense. The price of ensuring domestic obedience is likely to continue
rising as XI Jinping continues reaching back to Mao Zedong’s more totalitarian
model.
Moreover, the PRC’s defense needs are many, since it is surrounded by nations
with which it has been at war over the last century: Russia, India, Japan, Korea,
and Vietnam. Beijing has clients rather than allies, which will follow the best
deals. Its most important partnerships – with North Korea, Iran, Venezuela,
and Russia – are based on mutual antipathy toward the US However, these relationships
cause America trouble, not fear. The threat to America is small.
In dealing with the US most Chinese policymakers recognize the need for caution,
despite the recent rise of “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Anthony Cordesman
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently wrote that “it
is important to note that in some ways, the Chinese [defense] White Paper is
more moderate in its treatment of the US than US strategy papers have been in
discussing military developments in China.” Although the PRC acknowledges
that the two countries are strategic competitors, “the text is very careful,
however, to limit the level of this competition, and its wording makes it clear
that China understands the risks involved.”
Washington’s policy should reflect this important reality. Beijing has neither
the ability nor the reason to threaten America. Rather, China is challenging
the former’s dominance far abroad, rather than existence at home. Given Washington’s
overwhelming nuclear advantage, a Chinese attack on the US would be foolhardy
beyond reason. The PRC doesn’t even have a practical way to reach America with
conventional forces.
Washington has some possessions in the Asia-Pacific, most notably Guam and
the Commonwealth of Northern Marianna Islands. However, they are minor and Beijing
has never shown any interest in them, other than their likely role in US military
operations. In practice America remains secure from Chinese attack, with the
US homeland no more likely to be threatened by the PRC than by, say, Fiji.
If war erupts, it will be off China’s coast in East Asia. If either country
will be a battleground, it will be the PRC, not America. Any conflict will be
to defend US domination of those waters as well as countries allied with or
befriended by America, not the US The fundamental issue will be American influence,
not survival, the Chinese threat will be against interests far short of existential.
Washington still had good reason to avoid such a conflict. America’s military
remains superior, with better equipment and more experienced personnel. However,
recognizing the serious threat of US intervention, Beijing is determined to
create more capable armed forces. Noted the Defense Intelligence Agency in its
2019 report on the Chinese military: “In late 2015, President XI Jinping
unveiled the most substantial PLA reforms in at least 30 years. The reforms
were designed in part to make the PLA a leaner, more lethal force capable of
conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to
compete with the US military.”
The PRC faces substantial challenges in moving forward, but its capabilities
should not be underestimated. Added the DIA: “Today’s PLA is still far
from being able to deploy large numbers of conventional forces globally, but
China has developed nuclear, space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that
can reach potential adversaries across the globe.” Lyle Goldstein of the
Naval War College made a similar point: “it is important not to overestimate
US military advantages in any armed conflict with China. China has actually
pulled ahead in some discreet but important domains of modern warfare. Moreover,
the enormous weight of geography tends to negate many, if not most, US advantages
when actual scenarios are analyzed.”
Beijing’s task in any conflict with America is far simpler that Washington’s
objectives: defend against US attack. Beijing would not be sending a carrier
task force to bomb Pearl Harbor or an expeditionary force to seize Los Angeles.
Rather, if Beijing engaged in offensive operations, it would be against nearby
states over border/territorial disputes, as has happened with India and Vietnam,
or could happen in the future with Japan and the Philippines. The most serious
operation would be to coerce/conquer Taiwan. Given the difficulty of amphibious
operations, most observers believe the PRC would first attempt to use limited
means to force a negotiated surrender.
If Washington got involved, American forces would be on the move far from home,
intending to sink PLA naval vessels, interdict Chinese commercial trade, and
protect threatened islands, whether Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines. Beijing
would be on the strategic defensive against an aggressive US As the Pentagon
explained in its report last year on the PRC military: “China’s leaders
increasingly view the United States as adopting a more confrontational approach,
reflecting China’s long-held perception that the United States seeks to contain
China’s rise. Furthermore, China sees recent US actions on trade and the public
releases of US defense and national security strategies as indicative of this
containment strategy.”
In such a case, defense would be easier and cheaper than offense. The PRC would win by enforcing anti-access/area denial, that is, by preventing American forces from operating in the region. Explained the Pentagon: “China’s military modernization plan includes the development of A2/AD capabilities to conduct long-range attacks against adversary forces who might deploy or operate within the western Pacific Ocean. PLA capabilities are currently most robust within the first island chain, though China aims to strengthen its capabilities to extend farther into the Pacific Ocean. These capabilities span the air, maritime, space, electromagnetic, and information domains.”
This is a major objective of Chinese naval modernization. Noted the Congressional
Research Service, the navy is to “deter US intervention in a conflict in
China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay
the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening US forces.”
The US military is working to counteract such capabilities – in late July Defense
Secretary Mark Esper said that he was repositioning forces in preparation for
a confrontation with China – but to be successful such efforts cannot be conducted
on the cheap. Observed Michele Flournoy and Gabrielle Chefitz, both of WestExec
Associates (Flournoy also is a former undersecretary of defense for policy):
“If the Pentagon’s own reported war games and analysis are to be believed,
the current force may well be insufficient to deter or defeat Chinese aggression
in the future.” Which means more ships, planes, personnel, and perhaps
other capabilities are needed in the Pacific.
The simplest option would be to add additional units. However, that would require
more money, in short supply even before the COVID-19 bailout. What was expected
to be a $1 trillion deficit this year is likely to exceed $5 trillion, after
another round of emergency spending is eventually approved. Next year the red
ink will run more than $2 trillion. And even before this year’s budget tsunami,
warned the Congressional Budget Office, the deficit was heading up to $1.7 trillion
over the coming decade without any economic or financial crisis. Spending pressure
will continue to rise in succeeding years as more Baby Boomers retire, accelerating
the jump in Social Security and Medicare outlays. Expenditures on Medicaid and
interest also will rise, putting further pressure on the Pentagon. This impending
fiscal tsunami highlights the shocking irresponsibility of having wasted trillions
of dollars, thousands of lives, and unceasing effort on endless wars in the
Middle East over the last two decades.
Alternatively, the Pentagon could shift resources from other regions and purposes,
adapting personnel and equipment to new missions. Argued Washington Post
columnist David Ignatius: “It would be foolish to enter a new, post-pandemic
world with the same old hardware.” However, if the defense pie shrinks
finding money for any East Asian buildup would remain problematic. US officials
have consistently refused to set priorities, determined to continue defending
populous and prosperous Europe from Russia and engaging in frivolous nation-building
in the Middle East as well as containing China. Reprograming existing resources
would require fresh thinking in the Pentagon and Congress, which seems even
less likely than finding fresh money.
Whatever the US does, it will cost China less to respond. For instance, Beijing
does not need to launch 11 carrier groups. It only needs the means to sink 11
US carriers. Doing so still wouldn’t be easy, but the mere possibility would
necessarily affect American operations. Observed Ignatius: “China’s military
isn’t focused on projecting power, as ours is, but instead on preventing US
domination. Rather than match our fleets of carriers and squadrons of jets around
the world, Beijing developed precision weapons to prevent the United States
from mobilizing these forces.”
The PRC also has developed the ability to destroy nearby American bases, usually
considered to be Washington’s principle East Asian military asset. For instance,
the
Center for a New American Strategy considered Chinese missile capabilities.
Its conclusion: “The results of our modeling and simulation, which show
the potential for devastation of US power projection forces and bases in Asia,
are deeply concerning – and a call for action.” Rand Corporation war games
had
similar results. Reported Breaking Defense: “in RAND’s wargames, which
are often sponsored by the Pentagon, the US forces – colored blue on wargame
maps – suffer heavy losses in one scenario after another and still can’t stop
Russia or China – red – from achieving their objectives, like overrunning US
allies.”
The prospect of war, especially a potentially losing war, with the PRC requires
the American people to think carefully over what is worth fighting over. As
a globe-spanning power, the US has interests everywhere. However, few are important,
let alone vital. And military force should be the last resort to protect even
those that are most important.
In the case of East Asia, Washington would have to spend substantially more to maintain its ability to project force, a cost likely to be excessive given the interests actually at stake. And the PRC always will have far greater commitment to East Asia.
The region obviously is vital to Beijing. Two centuries ago Washington declared
the Monroe Doctrine for Latin America, ordering other powers to stay out. In
Asia the US has done the reverse, insisting that not only does it get to come
in, but it has the right to effectively exclude everyone else, including
neighboring nations. Unsurprisingly, this has not gone over well with the
PRC. The Chinese Foreign Ministry recently insisted: “The fundamental cause
of instability in the South China Sea is the large-scale military activities
and flexing of muscles by some nonregional country that lies tens of thousands
of miles away.”
America’s alliances are not a compelling reason for intervention. They should
be a means to an end, protecting America. Yet the 2018 National Defense Strategy
treated allies as an end, setting “Defending allies from military aggression
and bolstering partners against coercion” alongside “Defending the
homeland from attack” as objectives. Security policy should be centered
on American security, not foreign charity. Washington should not casually create
triggers for war by promising to protect countries not essential to US security.
Even when America is committed to the independence of allied states, such as
Japan, the US should not promise to defend contested territorial claims involving
such nations, like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Washington should limit its military
responsibilities to essentials.
That doesn’t mean the US should be indifferent to the fate of its friends.
In fact, they enjoy the same defensive advantage against the PRC as the US does
against China. Tokyo is well able to prevent a Chinese invasion, a highly unlikely
contingency, yet Japan spends less than one percent of GDP on the military.
The Philippines gets involved in naval scuffles with Beijing over barren rocks
in nearby waters with a navy whose flagship is a half-century old US Coast Guard
castoff. Because of their own deficiencies both want to borrow the US Navy in
an emergency. What allied states spend on the military is up to them, but they
should not clamor for Washington’s assistance when they are unwilling to make
a serious effort to defend themselves.
Limiting the threat of war to interests whose importance is evident even to
potential adversaries would further reduce the chances of war. Noted Goldstein:
“Perversely, American credibility is always under threat because Washington
is so reluctant to make hard choices and to establish limits to US security
guarantees. If alliances were interpreted in a clearly defensive manner (e.g.,
defense of home islands), issues of credibility would not arise, US credibility
would actually be strengthened, and defense requirements would be clarified.”
Diplomacy could help establish and define interests. Noted Goldstein: “what
is required is hard‐headed bargaining that leads to compromise on some
of the thorniest issues. Such compromises will serve US national security interests
by strictly limiting the costs and risks for the United States in an era of
tremendous and somewhat dangerous flux in Asian politics.” He offered numerous
suggestions involving treatment of allies, positions on contested claims, transparency
of military operations, weapons development, and more. There is no single, essential
outcome. The goal should be what he called “mutual accommodation,”
restraining behavior, reducing tensions, encouraging settlements, and pulling
all countries, especially Washington and Beijing, away from potential conflict.
The Beijing government is no friend of America or liberty. Domestically it is retrogressing to its totalitarian past. Internationally it is growing more assertive and potentially aggressive. Dealing with China is likely to become even more challenging in the future.
Yet fearmongering will only endanger US security. America remains far stronger
economically and militarily. Despite the Trump administration’s maladroit incompetence,
Washington has far more international friends. And Beijing, despite its growing
military strength, threatens not America, but interests more distant and less
important, including allied states which remain able to constrain and deter
the PRC.
Obviously, the security environment could change in the future. However, if
so the US has time to react, rather than undermine its economy today with a
needless military buildup over less than vital stakes. China’s future is uncertain,
and may turn out far less threatening that many presume. In any case, Washington
should use the intervening years to seek a modus vivendi with Beijing allowing
both nations to live together in peace. America must not risk turning the PRC
into an enemy by treating it like one.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant
to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New
Global Empire.
[ad_2]
Source link
Leave a Reply