What Weapons Systems Won’t The U.S. Sell The UAE?

If the proposed U.S. arms sale of F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters and Reaper drones to the United Arab Emirates initiated by the outgoing Trump administration survives the incoming Biden administration then it would seem that there are few, if any, weapons systems Washington won’t sell Abu Dhabi.

In December, the U.S. Senate narrowly voted against two resolutions aimed at blocking this contentious deal. Incoming Secretary of State Anthony Blinken noted in a November interview that the Obama administration had sought only to make F-35s available to Israel. He said the incoming Biden administration will have to “take a hard look” at this latest sale to see if it violates Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) over the Middle East. The Israeli government, which initially opposed the sale when it was announced in August 2020, has since signaled its approval, which could weigh heavily in favor of the deal being implemented. 

Nevertheless, the Biden administration is expected to, unlike its predecessor, seriously scrutinize arms sales to the Gulf states, especially since U.S.-supplied arms have been used extensively by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Opponents of the sale cite the dire humanitarian situation, rights abuses, and civilian deaths in Yemen as well as the risk of sensitive U.S. military technology being leaked to either Russia and China, two countries with which Abu Dhabi maintains military relations. 

Even if this arms package is ultimately canceled, however, the UAE has long been a favored arms client of the United States and has, for the most part, been allowed to buy almost whatever military hardware it wants. 

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When the Nixon administration began implementing its eponymous foreign policy doctrine that sought to delegate greater defense responsibilities to U.S. allies, the Shah of Iran, whose country grew tremendously wealthy overnight in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, seized the opportunity to rapidly make Tehran the predominant military power in the Persian Gulf region. Throughout the 1970s, the U.S. made several lucrative, and record-breaking arms sales to Imperial Iran, essentially selling the Shah any conventional weapons systems he desired.

Before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran acquired enormous quantities of modern weapons systems from Washington, most notably a fleet of advanced F-14 Tomcat air superiority fighter jets armed with deadly long-range AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, the only other country to which the U.S. ever sold that iconic plane. Jimmy Carter complained about such sales during the 1976 presidential election, pointing out that Iran would get a more advanced version of the U.S.-built Spruance-class destroyer than the U.S. Navy. 

The Gulf monarchies have since surpassed the Shah’s enormous arms build-up. The UAE is allowed to buy pretty much whatever weapons system it wants from the U.S., with few exceptions. As with the Shah in the 1970s, it can also afford pretty much anything it wants. Also, the U.S. has a lot of trust in the UAE. After all, it sold it more advanced F-16s than those flown in the U.S. Air Force in the late 1990s, the first time Washington ever did such a thing. Furthermore, the CIA reportedly doesn’t even spy on that country.

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While modern-day UAE and the Shah’s Iran both acquired most of their weapons from the U.S., they sought arms from other sources when Washington declined certain requests. For example, when the U.S. refused to sell the Shah ballistic missiles, at a time Iraq was acquiring its arsenal of Scud missiles, he participated in a secret program with Israel, Project Flower, to jointly develop a missile. He also reportedly bought a small number of R-17E Scud (referred to as Scud-B by NATO) missiles from the Soviet Union. Similarly, when the U.S. showed reluctance to sell him sophisticated airborne early warning and control (AWACS) planes, he said he could instead seek a similar aircraft from Britain, the Nimrod. The Shah often reiterated that the weapons he sought were purely for Iran’s defensive needs rather than to please any country. 

In more recent years, the UAE has similarly diversified its defense procurements so it doesn’t have to entirely depend on the U.S. Before the UAE’s normalized relations with Israel in August 2020, Washington was reluctant to sell it F-35s, only agreeing to sell Israel that advanced aircraft to help maintain that country’s QME. That didn’t dissuade the Gulf nation from exploring other options for procuring alternative fifth-generation warplanes. 

In 2017, Russia announced a project to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter, reportedly based on the MiG-29, with the UAE – although no known headway has been made on the project ever since. Also, in 2019, Moscow suggested that Abu Dhabi could produce components for its fifth-generation Su-57 Felon in addition to procuring that stealth fighter.

Until recently, the U.S. strictly adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to prevent the proliferation of armed drones and long-range ballistic missiles. Since Washington wouldn’t sell it drones, Abu Dhabi bought CAIG Wing Loong II drones from China, which isn’t a signatory of the MTCR, and used them in conflicts in both Yemen and Libya.

As with Iran during the Shah’s time, the U.S. doesn’t sell ballistic missiles to the Gulf states. But that certainly hasn’t stopped them from procuring such missiles elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia has Chinese-made DF-3A and DF-21 ballistic missiles that it procured in 1988 and 2007, respectively. More recently, it was reported to have expanded its ballistic missile program with China’s help. Qatar also procured SY-400 short-range ballistic missiles from China that it first revealed it possessed in 2017. The UAE also purchased some Scud-B missiles from North Korea back in 1989.

Abu Dhabi might prove more likely to turn to Israel in the not-too-distant future if it seeks more advanced ballistic missiles, especially if a new arms race transpires between it and Iran. Israel developed the LORA quasi-ballistic missile with a range of 250 miles that it exported to Azerbaijan. Baku used at least one of these missiles to knock out a bridge during its latest war with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in late 2020. 

The UAE may seek such missiles as defense ties with Israel are bound to increase in the coming years. Israeli ingenuity coupled with Emirati capital may even lead to the joint development of newer, more advanced missiles — perhaps as part of an initiative not dissimilar to the stated goals of Project Flower.

Abu Dhabi would almost certainly play a pivotal role in any future U.S.-led Middle Eastern regional integrated air defense system aimed at countering Iranian ballistic missiles and the increasingly sophisticated missiles and rockets possessed by Tehran’s regional proxies Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the numerous Shiite militia groups in Iraq. 

The UAE already possesses a very advanced air defense system replete with U.S.-built MIM-104 PAC-3 Patriot missiles, high-altitude long-range Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) as well as Russian-built Pantsir-S1s. It could well seek Israeli missiles, such as the short- medium-range Iron Dome and Barak-8 missile defense systems, in the near future. Israel may even help the UAE develop air defense systems in a project similar to the medium-range MRSAM surface-to-air missile it jointly built with India in recent years that was successfully tested in December 2020.

Already, the UAE’s highly formidable multi-layered air defenses are reportedly tasked with defending the airspace of other Gulf monarchies in addition to its own.

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In conclusion, whatever the case ultimately proves to be, Abu Dhabi is likely to get whatever weapons it wants, at least eventually.